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ABSTRACT
We study the international monetary policy design problem within an optimizing two-country
sticky price model, where each country faces a short run tradeoff between output and inflation. The model
is sufficiently tractable to solve analytically. We find that in the Nash equilibrium, the policy problem for
each central bank is isomorphic to the one it would face if it were a closed economy. Gains from
cooperation arise, however, that stem from the impact of foreign economic activity on the domestic
marginal cost of production. While under Nash central banks need only adjust the interest rate in response
to domestic inflation, under cooperation they should respond to foreign inflation as well. In either
scenario, flexible exchange rates are desirable.
Richard Clarida Jordi Gali Mark Gertler
Department of Economics CREI Department of Economics
Columbia University Universitat Pompeu Fabra New York University
420 West 118th St. Ramon Trias Fargas 25 269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
Room 1014 IAB 08005 Barcelona Spain New York, NY 10003
New York, NY 10027 and NBER and NBER
and NBER jordi.gali@econ.upf.es mark.gertler@nyu.edu
rhc2@columbia.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The existence of a short run tradeoﬀ between output and inﬂation is a central
obstacle to the smooth management of monetary policy. In the open econ-
omy, of course, there are additional complications: Not only must a central
bank take account of the exchange rate in this situation, but potentially also
the feedback responses of foreign central banks to its policy actions.
In this paper we revisit these classic issues by developing a simple two
country model that is useful for international policy analysis. Consistent with
a voluminous recent literature, our framework is optimization-based and is
suﬃciently tractable to admit an analytical solution.1 In most of this work
(particularly the work that is purely analytical), nominal price setting is done
on a period by period basis, leading to highly unrealistic dynamics.2 We use
instead the staggered price setting model that has become the workhorse of
monetary policy analysis in the closed economy, and augment it by allowing
for a short run tradeoﬀ in a way that does not sacriﬁce tractability. Thus, we
are able to investigate qualitatively the implications of international consid-
erations for monetary policy management without having to abstract from
the central problem that the tradeoﬀ poses.
Our framework is essentially a two country version of the small open econ-
omy model we developed in Clarida, Galí, Gertler (CGG) (2001), which is in
turn based on Galí and Monacelli (2001). In this paper we showed that under
certain conditions the monetary policy problem is isomorphic to the problem
of the closed economy studied in CGG (1999). In this setting, accordingly,
the qualitative insights for monetary policy management are very similar to
what arises for the closed economy. International considerations, though,
may have quantitative implications, as openness does aﬀect the model para-
meters and thus the coeﬃcients of the optimal feedback policy. In addition,
openness gives rise to an important distinction between consumer price index
(cpi) inﬂation and domestic inﬂation. To the extent there is perfect exchange
rate pass through, we ﬁnd that the central bank should target domestic inﬂa-
1Some examples of this recent literature include: Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000), Corsetti
and Pesenti (2001a), Kollmann, McCallum and Nelson (1999), Devereaux and Engle
(2000), Lane (2001), and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000).
2A recent exception is Benigno and Benigno (2001) who have concurrently emphasized
some similar themes as in our paper, though the details of the two approaches diﬀer
considerably. We introduce a short run tradeoﬀ by allowing for staggered price setting in
conjunction with a certain type of labor market friction, as we discuss in the next section.
2tion and allow the exchange rate to ﬂoat, despite the impact of the resulting
exchange rate variability on the cpi.
In the two country setting we study here, the monetary policy problem
is sensitive to the nature of the strategic interaction between central banks.
In the absence of cooperation (the “Nash” case), our earlier “isomorphism”
result is preserved. Each country confronts a policy problem that is quali-
tatively the same as the one a closed economy would face. The two country
framework, though, allows us to characterize the equilibrium exchange rate
and illustrate concretely how short run tradeoﬀ considerations enhance the
desirability of ﬂexible exchange rates.
The strict isomorphism result, however, breaks down when we allow for
the possibility of international monetary coordination. There are potentially
gains from cooperation within our framework, though they are somewhat
diﬀerent in nature than stressed in the traditional literature, as they are
supply side. In particular, the domestic marginal cost of production and
the domestic potential output depend on the terms of trade, which in turn
depends on foreign economic activity. By coordinating policy to take account
of this spillover, central banks can in principle improve welfare. As we show,
coordination alters the Nash equilibrium in a simple and straightforward way.
Among other things, we show that it is possible to implement the optimal
policy under coordination by having each central bank pursue an interest rate
feedback rule of the form that was optimal under Nash (a kind of Taylor rule),
but augmented to respond to foreign inﬂa t i o na sw e l la sd o m e s t i ci n ﬂation.
In section 2 below we characterize the behavior of households and ﬁrms.
Section 3 describes the equilibrium. Section 4 describes the policy problem
and the solution in the Nash case. In section 5, we consider the case of
cooperation. Concluding remarks are in section 6. Finally, the appendix
provides explicit derivations of the welfare functions.
2 The Model
The framework is a variant of a dynamic New Keynesian Model applied to
the open economy, in the spirit of much recent literature3.T h e r e a r e t w o
countries, home and foreign, that diﬀer in size but are otherwise symmetric.
The home country (H) has a mass of households 1−γ, and the foreign country
(F) has a mass γ. Otherwise preferences and technologies are the same across
3See Lane (2001) for a survey.
3countries, though shocks may be imperfectly correlated. Within each country,
households consume a domestically produced good and an imported good.
Households in both countries also have access to a complete set of Arrow-
Debreu securities which can be traded both domestically and internationally.
Domestic production takes place in two stages. First, there is a contin-
uum of intermediate goods ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerentiated material
input. Final goods producers then combine these inputs into output, which
they sell to households. Intermediate goods producers are monopolistic com-
petitors who each produce a diﬀerentiated product and set nominal prices
on a staggered basis. Final goods producers are perfectly competitive. We
assume that the number of ﬁnal goods ﬁr m sw i t h i ne a c hc o u n t r ye q u a l st h e
number of households. Though, we normalize the number of intermediate
goods ﬁrms at unity in each country.4
Only nominal prices are sticky. As is well known, in the absence of other
frictions, with pure forward looking price setting there is no short run tradeoﬀ
between output and inﬂation5. To introduce a short run tradeoﬀ in a way that
is analytically tractable, we assume that households have some market power
in the labor market, and then introduce exogenous variation in this market
power as a convenient way to generate cost-push pressures on inﬂation.
We next present the decision problems of households and ﬁrms.
2.1 Households





















PH,t is the terms of trade and k ≡ (1 − γ)(1−γ)γγ.
4As will become clear, making the number of intermediate goods ﬁrms the same across
countries ensures that ﬁnal goods producers within each country face the same technology.
5See, for example, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999).
4Let Nt(h) denote the household’s h hours of labor, with Wt(h) the corre-
sponding nominal wage. Let Dt+1 denote the (random) payoﬀ of the portfolio
purchased at t,w i t hQt,t+1 the corresponding stochastic discount factor. Fi-
nally, let Tt denote lump sum taxes and Γt denote lump sum proﬁts accruing
from ownership of intermediate goods ﬁrms. Then the representative house-





t [U(Ct) − V (Nt(h))] (3)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints
PtCt + Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Wt(h) Nt(h)+Dt − Tt + Γt (4)
In addition, the household is a monopolistically competitive supplier of
















is the relevant aggregate wage index. The elasticity of labor demand, ηt,i s
the same across workers, but may vary over time. Note that this particular
demand curve evolves from a production technology that has labor input a
CES aggregate of individual household labor hours, as we describe in the
next sub-section.
We specialize the period utility function to be of the form:









The ﬁrst order necessary conditions for consumption allocation and intertem-
poral optimization are standard:
PH,t CH,t =( 1− γ) PtCt (7)
6The assumption of complete markets guarantees that consumption is equated across
households.
5PF,t CF,t = γ PtCt (8)
β (Ct+1/Ct)
−σ (Pt/Pt+1)=Qt,t+1 (9)
Let Rt denote the gross nominal yield on a one-period discount bond. Then






t = Et{Qt,t+1} is the price of the discount bond.












ηt−1 is the optimal wage markup. In contrast to Erceg, Hender-
son, and Levin (2000), wages are perfectly ﬂexible, implying the absence of
any endogenous variation in the wage markup resulting from wage rigidities.
On the other hand we allow for exogenous variation in the wage markup aris-
ing from shifts in ηt, interpretable as exogenous variation in workers’ market
power.7 Note that because wages are ﬂexible, all workers will charge the
same wage and have the same level of hours. Thus we can write:
Wt(h)=Wt
Nt(h)=Nt (12)
for all h ∈ [0,1 − γ] and all t.
As y m m e t r i cs e to fﬁrst order conditions holds for citizens of the foreign
country. In particular, given the international tradability of state-contingent











7To be clear, we assume exogenous variation in the wage markup only for simplicity.
In our view this approach provides a convenient way to obtain some of the insights that
arise when there is an endogenous markup due to wage rigidity.
6The law of one price, which implies Pt = Et P ∗
t for all t, in conjunction with








Each ﬁnal goods ﬁrm in the home country uses a continuum of intermediate










where Yt denotes aggregate output, while Yt(f) is the input produced by
intermediate goods ﬁrm f. Both variables are normalized by population size
1 − γ, i.e., they are expressed in per capita terms. Proﬁt maximization,


















Each intermediate goods ﬁrm produces output using a technology that is
linear in labor input, Nt(f) (also normalized by population size), as follows:
8As in Corsetti and Pesenti (2000), Benigno and Benigno (2000), the complete asset
market equilibrium can be achieved in a simple asset market in which only nominal bonds
are traded.
7Yt(f)=At Nt(f) (18)
where At is an exogenous technology parameter. The labor used by each ﬁrm













Aggregating across optimizing intermediate goods ﬁrms yields the market
demand curve for household labor given by equation (5), where the techno-
logical parameter ηt is the wage elasticity of hours demand. Because in
equilibrium each household charges the same wage and supplies the same
number of hours, we can treat the ﬁrm’s decision problem over total labor
demand as just involving the aggregates Nt(f) and Wt. We also assume that
each ﬁrm receives a subsidy of τ percent of its wage bill.
In addition, intermediate goods ﬁrms set prices on a staggered basis as in
Calvo (1983), where θ is the probability a ﬁrm keeps its price ﬁx e di nag i v e n
period and 1− θ is the probability it changes it, where probability draws are
i.i.d. over time. Firms that do not adjust their price simply adjust output
to meet demand (assuming they operate in a region with a non-negative net
markup.) In either case, choosing labor to minimize costs conditional on
output yields:
MCt =








where MCt denotes the real marginal cost. Observe that, given the constant
returns technology and the aggregate nature of shocks, real marginal cost is
t h es a m ea c r o s sﬁrms.
Firms that are able to choose their price optimally in period t choose the
reset price P0









H,t − PH,t+j MCt+j
¢
(21)
subject to the demand curve (16). The solution to this problem implies that














Note that if a ﬁrm was able to freely adjust its price each period, it will

















We begin by characterizing the equilibrium conditional on output. How the
model is closed depends on the behavior of prices and monetary policy. We
ﬁrst characterize the ﬂexible price equilibrium, for which an exact solution is
available, and then turn to the case of staggered price setting, for which an
approximate solution is available.
Goods market clearing in the home and foreign countries implies:





t =( 1− γ) CF,t + γ C
∗
F,t (26)
The demand curves for home and foreign goods by home citizens, equa-
tions (7) and (8), respectively, along with the analogues for foreign citizens





It then follows (after also taking into account equations (25) and (26))
that the trade balance is zero within each country
9Note that we assume producer currency pricing and complete-pass through. Devereux
and Engle (2000), among others, have emphasized the role of local currency pricing.










In turn, combining equations (2) and (28) implies an aggregate demand
schedule that relates domestic per capita output, per capita consumption,













as well as an aggregate demand schedule. Observe that equations (30), (31)
and the consumption Euler equation (10) determine domestic output de-
mand, conditional on foreign output and the path of the real interest. In
addition, (30) and (31) can be combined to yield an expression for consump-
tion as a function of domestic and foreign output:





On the supply side, notice that Nt =
R 1








df ,a n d













Combining the labor supply and demand relations, equations (11) and
(20) respectively, and then using the aggregate demand schedule (30) and
the aggregate production function (33) to eliminate Ct and Nt yields the
following expression for real marginal cost:











=( 1 − τ)k












10where κ and κo are the elasticities of marginal cost with respect to domestic
and foreign output, given by
κ ≡ σ(1 − γ)+γ + φ (36)
= σ + φ − κo
and
κo ≡ σγ − γ (37)
= γ(σ − 1)
As will become clear, the implications of international considerations for
monetary policy within this framework depend critically on how the open
economy aﬀects the behavior of marginal cost, as summarized by the behavior
of the two key elasticities, κ and κo.N o t e ﬁrst that the sign of κo, the
elasticity of marginal cost with respect to foreign output, is ambiguous. There
are two eﬀects of a change in Y ∗
t on MCt that work in opposite directions:
Ar i s ei nY ∗
t causes the terms of trade to appreciate which, holding constant
domestic consumption, reduces marginal cost, as equation (35) suggests, and
as reﬂected by the term −γ in (37). At the same time, however, holding
constant domestic output, the increase in Y ∗
t raises domestic consumption
due to risk sharing, leading to an increase in marginal cost (since the rise
in Ct increases the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure). The latter wealth eﬀect, captured by the term σγ in (37), dominates
the terms of trade eﬀect if σ > 1 (implying κo > 0); and vice versa if σ < 1
(implying κo < 0).
In turn, the impact of the open economy on κ, the elasticity of marginal
cost with respect to domestic output, depends inversely on κo. An increase
in Yt, for example, causes a depreciation in the terms of trade, raising MCt.
That eﬀect is captured by the term γ in (36). Due to risk sharing, however,
consumption increases by proportionately less than the increase in domestic
output, which works to dampen the increase in marginal cost (relative to the
closed economy), as reﬂected by the term σ(1 − γ) in (36). Finally, there is
a third channel, also found in the closed economy, through which domestic
output variations aﬀect marginal cost, and which works through the eﬀect
on employment and the disutility of labor, as captured by the term φ.I nt h e
end, whether openness increases or decreases the elasticity of marginal cost
with respect to domestic output (relative to the closed economy) depends on
11t h es i z eo fσ. Again, the wealth eﬀect dominates the terms of trade eﬀect
when σ > 1,. implying κo > 0.In this instance, the open economy’s aggregate
marginal cost schedule is ﬂatter than its closed economy counterpart (i.e.,
since κo > 0, κ is below its value for a closed economy (given by σ + φ),
holding constant the preference parameters σ and φ.
We emphasize that in the knife-edge case of logarithmic utility (σ =1 ) ,
the terms of trade and risk sharing eﬀects cancel. In this instance, there are
no direct eﬀects of the open economy on marginal cost: κo =0and κ = σ+φ,
exactly as for a closed economy.
To summarize, we have characterized the values of Ct, St, MCt and Nt
conditioned on Yt, Vt (which captures the dispersion of output across ﬁrms)
and Y ∗







t conditional on Y ∗
t , V ∗
t and Yt .H o ww ec l o s et h e
model depends on the behavior of prices.
3.1 Equilibrium under Flexible Prices
We consider an equilibrium with ﬂexible prices where the wage markup is
ﬁxed at its steady state value 1+µw. We focus on this case because we would
like to deﬁne a measure of the natural level of output that has the feature
that cyclical ﬂuctuations in this construct do not reﬂect variations in the
degree of eﬃciency (hence we shut oﬀ variation in the wage markup). This
approach also makes sense if we think of variations in the wage markup as
standing in for wage rigidity.
In addition, we make the distinction between the equilibrium that arises
when prices are ﬂexible at home, taking foreign output as given, and the one
that arises when prices are ﬂexible across the globe. We refer to the former as
the “domestic ﬂexible price equilibrium” and the latter as (just) the “ﬂexible
price equilibrium”. The distinction between these two concepts becomes
highly relevant when we compare the Nash versus cooperative equilibria.
3.1.1 The Domestic Flexible Price Equilibrium
Let a variable with an upper bar (e.g. Xt)d e n o t ei t sv a l u ew h e np r i c e sa r e
ﬂexible at home, but foreign output is taken as exogenously given (indepen-
dently of how it is determined). We proceed to characterize the domestic
ﬂexible price equilibrium, as follows:
12Under ﬂexible prices, all ﬁrms set their price equal to a constant markup
over marginal cost, as implied by condition (23). Symmetry, further, implies




equation (23) implies that in the ﬂexible price equilibrium, real marginal cost




where we use the bar to denote the domestic ﬂexible price equilibrium value
of a variable. Symmetry of prices further implies that all ﬁrms choose the
same level of output, inducing V t =1 . Hence, from equation (33),
Yt = At Nt (39)
Furthermore, using the fact that MCt =( 1+µp)−1 and ﬁxing the wage
markup at its steady state then permits us to use equation (35) to solve for











Note that the impact of foreign output Y ∗
t on Yt, depends on the sign
of κo.I fκo < 0 (implying that MCt is decreasing in foreign output Y ∗
t ),
then Yt varies positively with Y ∗
t ; and vice-versa if κo > 0. With κo =0 , Yt
depends only on domestic economic factors.
3.1.2 Flexible Price Equilibrium
We obtained the domestic natural level of output, Yt, by taking foreign output
as exogenously given. As we discussed earlier, it is also useful to deﬁne the






















133.2 Equilibrium Dynamics under Sticky Prices
We now express the system with sticky prices as a loglinear approximation
about the steady state that determines behavior conditional on a path for the
nominal interest rate. We use lower case variables to denote log deviations
from the deterministic steady state.
From equation (30), aggregate demand is given by
yt = ct + γ st (42)
where, from the euler equation (10), aggregate consumption evolves according
to
ct = Et{ct+1} −
1
σ
(rt − Et{πt+1} − γEt{∆st+1}) (43)
where rt is the nominal rate of interest, πt+1 i st h er a t eo fd o m e s t i ci n ﬂation
from t to t+1and where, from equation (31), the terms of trade is given by
st = yt − y
∗
t (44)
On the supply side, the ﬁrst order approximation to the aggregate pro-
duction function (33) implies:
yt = at + nt (45)
Further, combining the log-linearized optimal price setting rule (22) with the
price index (24) yields
πt = δ mct + βEt{πt+1} (46)
where δ =
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ .L e t e yt = yt − yt denote the domestic output gap,
i.e., the gap between output and the domestic natural level. Then from
the loglinearized version of the expression for marginal cost (35) and the
production function (45), we obtain10
mct = κ e yt + µ
w
t (47)
where from equation (40):
10From the loglinearized version of the expression for marginal cost (35), we obtain
mct = µw
t + κyt + κoy∗
t − (1 + φ) at. Combining this expression with equation (48) then
yields equation (47).
14yt = κ
−1[(1 + φ) at − κo y
∗
t] (48)
It is straightforward to collapse the system into an IS and Phillips type
equations that determine e yt and πt conditional on the path of rt:
e yt = Et{e yt+1} − σ
−1
o [rt − Et{πt+1} − rrt] (49)
πt = β Et{πt+1} + λ e yt + ut (50)
with σo = σ − κo, λ = δκ,a n dut = δb µ
w
t , and where rrt is the domestic
natural real interest rate (conditional on foreign output), given by:
rrt = σo Et{∆yt+1} + κo Et{∆y
∗
t+1} (51)




o =( 1−γ)(σ −1), κ∗ = σ∗
o +φ, and λ
∗ = δκ∗. In addition, we assume that
the “cost push shock” ut obeys the following stationary ﬁrst order process:
ut = ρut−1 + εt (52)
with 0 < ρ < 1, and where εt is white noise.
As discussed in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2001) and Galí and Monacelli
(2001) for the case of a small open economy, the form of the system is iso-
morphic to that of the closed economy. Open economy eﬀects enter in two
ways: ﬁrst, through the impact of the parameter σo which aﬀects both the
interest elasticity of domestic demand (equal to σ−1
o ) and the slope coeﬃcient
on the output gap λ = δκ; and, second, via the impact of foreign output on
the natural real interest rate and natural output levels. In the special case of
log utility (implying σo = σ and κo =0 ), the open economy eﬀects disappear
and the system becomes identical to that of a closed economy.
Finally, we obtain a simple expression linking the terms of trade to move-
ments in the output gap:
st =( e yt − e y
∗
t)+( yt − y
∗
t) (53)
=( e yt − e y
∗
t)+st
where st is the natural level of the terms of trade.
154 Welfare and Optimal Policy: the Non Co-
operative Case
In this section we analyze the problem of a domestic central bank that seeks
to maximize the utility of domestic households, while taking as given foreign
economic activity. We assume that the ﬁscal authority chooses a tax rate
that makes the natural level of output correspond to the eﬃcient level in a
zero inﬂation steady state. In particular, we assume that the ﬁscal authority
chooses a subsidy rate τ that maximizes the utility of the domestic household
in a zero inﬂation steady state (i.e., in the absence of cost-push shocks), while
taking as given foreign variables. As shown in the appendix, the subsidy must
satisfy
(1 − τ)(1 + µ
w)(1 + µ
p)(1 − γ)=1 (54)




p) γ =1 (55)
Note that the subsidy does not simply oﬀeset the steady state price and
wage markups. Roughly speaking, the ﬁscal authority must balance the de-
sirability of oﬀsetting the ineﬃciencies from the steady state price and wage
markups, against the need to eliminate the central bank’s incentive to gener-
ate an unanticipated deﬂation. As discussed by Corsetti and Pesenti (2000),
in the non-cooperative case, a central bank may be tempted to produce a sur-
prise currency appreciation. In turn, Benigno and Benigno (2001) show that
in this case, the optimal subsidy allows for a positive steady state markup
distortion that creates an incentive for unanticipated inﬂation that exactly
oﬀsets the incentive for a surprise deﬂation. We refer to the resulting steady
state as the Nash steady state.
As we show in the appendix, to derive the central bank’s objective func-
tion, we take second order approximation of the utility of the representative
household around the domestic ﬂexible price equilibrium. After an appro-
priate normalization, we obtain the following quadratic objective, where the
welfare loss from a deviation from the optimum is expressed as a fraction of
steady state consumption:
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δ and α ≡ κδ
ξ = λ
ξ. (Recall that ξ is the price elasticity of demand
for intermediate goods (see equation (16)).
Given that the home central bank takes foreign output as exogenous, the
objective function is of the same form as that for a closed economy. In par-
ticular, the central bank minimizes a loss function that is quadratic in the
domestic output gap and domestic inﬂation, with a weight α on the output
gap. It is worth noting that the relevant inﬂation variable is domestic in-
ﬂation, as opposed to overall cpi inﬂation.11. In particular, the parameter
α diﬀers from the closed economy counterpart only to the extent σo diﬀers
from σ. Otherwise, the objective function (including the underlying para-
metric speciﬁcation of α) is identical to the one that would arise in the closed
economy.
Given that the IS and AS curves also have the same form as in the closed
economy, the overall policy problem is completely isomorphic to the closed
economy, as we found in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2001). Here we focus
on the case in which the central bank lacks a commitment technology that
would allow it to choose credibly, once and for all, an optimal state-contingent
plan.12 Instead we assume the central bank will choose e yt and πt each period
to maximize equation (56) subject to the aggregate supply curve given by
equation (50), taking expectations of the future as given.
The solution satisﬁes:




= −ξπ t (58)
Substituting this optimality condition into (50) and solving forward yields
the following reduced form solutions for the domestic inﬂation and the do-
mestic output gap in terms of the cost push shock:
πt = ψ ut (59)
11See, e.g., Woodford (1999). As in the closed economy, the presence of domestic inﬂa-
tion in the objective function reﬂects the costs of resource misallocation due to relative
price dispersion, where the latter is approximately proportionate to inﬂation. Note that
if there were pricing to market, with sticky prices in the ﬁnal traded goods sector, then a
measure of cpi inﬂation would instead enter the objective function. The same would be
t r u ei ft r a d ew e r ei ni n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d s ,w i t hﬁnal goods prices sticky, as in McCallum
and Nelson (1999).
12The same assumption applies to both central banks jointly in the cooperative case
considered below.
17e yt = −ξψ ut (60)
where ψ ≡ [(1 − βρ)+λξ]−1 > 0 (recall that ρ reﬂects the serial correlation
in the ut shock.) Similar expressions hold for the foreign economy.
Several points are worth emphasizing. First, the policy response is identi-
cal in form to the closed economy case (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999).
There is a lean against the wind response to domestic inﬂation, as suggested
by the optimality condition given by (57). In addition, in the absence of
cost push shocks the central bank is able to simultaneously maintain price
stability and close the output gap. Otherwise, a cost push shock generates a
tradeoﬀ between the output gap and inﬂation of the same form that applies
for the closed economy. Interestingly, openness does not aﬀect the optimal-
ity condition that dictates how aggressively the central bank should adjust
the output gap in response to deviations of inﬂation from target.13 Further,
openness aﬀects the reduced form elasticity of πt and e yt with respect to the
cost push shock only to the extent it aﬀects the slope of the Phillips curve,
λ, through its impact on the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to out-
put, κ, as discussed above. Finally, we observe that while πt and e yt may be
insulated from foreign disturbances, the overall level of domestic output will
depend on foreign shocks, since the domestic natural level of output depends
on foreign output (via the terms of trade and consumption), as equation (48)
makes clear.
We may combine the IS curve (49) with the solutions for e yt and πt to
obtain an expression for an interest rate rule that implements this policy:14






13This result arises from our explicit derivation of the weight α, which yields a restriction
on the ratio λ/α which governs the optimal adjustment of the output gap to inﬂation. In
particular, λ/α = ξ which does not depend on openness. The rough intuition for why
the optimal policy becomes more aggressive in combating inﬂation as ξ rises is that the
costs of resource misallocation from relative price dispersion depends on the elasticity of
demand.
14This is one among many possible representations of an interest rate rule that would
implement the time consistent policy under the Nash case considered here.
18As in the case of the closed economy, the optimal rule may be expressed
as the sum of two components: the domestic natural real interest rate, and
a term that has the central bank adjust the nominal rate more than one for
one with respect to domestic inﬂation. Openness aﬀects the slope coeﬃcient
only to the extent it aﬀects the interest elasticity of domestic spending, given
by σo. Note also that the terms of trade does not enter the rule directly, but
rather does so indirectly via its impact on the domestic equilibrium real rate.
To summarize, we have:
Proposition 1 In the Nash equilibrium, the policy problem a country faces
is isomorphic to the one it would face if it were a closed economy. As in
the case of a closed economy, the optimal policy rule under discretion may be
expressed as a Taylor rule that is linear in the domestic natural real interest
rate and expected domestic inﬂation. Open economy considerations aﬀect the
slope coeﬃcient on domestic inﬂation in the rule, as well as the behavior of
the domestic natural real interest rate.
Finally, there are some interesting implications for the behavior of the
terms of trade and the nominal exchange rate in the Nash equilibrium. To
gain some intuition we restrict attention to the symmetric case of γ = 1
2
(implying σo = σ∗
o). In this instance
st =( e yt − e y
∗
t)+( yt − y
∗
t) (62)
= −ξψ (ut − u
∗
t)+( at − a
∗
t)
The terms of trade depends not only on the relative productivity diﬀer-
entials, but also on the relative cost push shocks. A positive cost push shock
in the home country induces an appreciation in the terms of trade.
Using the deﬁnition of the terms of trade, we may write:
et ≡ et−1 + st − st−1 + πt − π
∗
t (63)
= et−1 − ξψ (∆ut − ∆u
∗
t)+( ∆at − ∆a
∗
t)+ψ (ut − u
∗
t)
= et−1 − (ξ − 1)ψ (ut − u
∗
t)+ξψ (ut−1 − u
∗
t−1)+( ∆at − ∆a
∗
t)
Notice that, in general, the nominal exchange rate should respond to rel-
ative diﬀerences in cost push shocks, in addition to the productivity shocks.
19Given that ξ > 1, a country that experiences a relatively high cost-push shock
should engineer a short run appreciation of its currency, followed by an even-
tual permanent depreciation. The initial appreciation is a consequence of the
terms of trade appreciation resulting from the contraction in the output gap
that is needed to dampen inﬂationary pressures. The eventual depreciation
to a permanently lower plateau results from the permanent eﬀect of the shock
on the domestic price level, which has a unit root under the optimal time
consistent policy. Notice that it also not optimal to peg the exchange rate
in response to relative productivity shocks: the adjustment of the exchange
rate makes it possible to fully avoid a change in inﬂation that would be costly
from a welfare standpoint.
It is also interesting to observe that the nominal exchange rate is non-
stationary in this instance. This result obtains because each central bank is
operating under discretion, which implies that inﬂation targeting is optimal
within this kind of framework (see CGG, 1999). The latter property results
in a non stationary price level. Under commitment, price level targeting
would be optimal for this type of environment. In that instance, and so long
as both central banks optimize under commitment, the nominal exchange
rate would be stationary.
5 The Cooperative Equilibrium
Next we consider optimal policy under cooperation. We assume that the two
central banks agree to pursue a policy that maximizes a weighted average
of the utilities of home and foreign households, with weights determined by
the relative size of the two economies. Whereas under Nash, each central
bank designs an optimal policy taking the other country’s economy as given,
in this case there is explicit coordination. As we show further, any gains
from policy coordination stem from the eﬀects of foreign economic activity
on domestic marginal cost of production.
Since there is complete consumption insurance, the period utility function
relevant to the policy maker is the following:
U(Ct) − (1 − γ) V (Nt) − γ V (N
∗
t ) (64)
We also assume that both economies jointly choose the employment subsidy
that maximizes this objective function in the steady state. Under coopera-
tion, each central bank refrains from creating a surprise currency apprecia-
20tion that might otherwise be tempting under Nash. As a consequence, as we
shown in the appendix, each economy will set the subsidy at a level that ex-
actly oﬀsets the distortions associated with market power in goods and labor
markets. More speciﬁcally, the common subsidy τ will satisfy the following
condition:
(1 − τ)(1 + µ
w)(1 + µ
p)=1 (65)
Given that the steady state markups are the same across countries, each
ﬁscal authority will choose the same subsidy. It is important to note that
with this subsidy in place, the equilibrium allocation under globally ﬂexible
prices and no wage markup shocks is optimal. We refer to the equilibrium
as the cooperative steady state.
It is convenient to deﬁne the output gap, e e yt, as the percent deviation
of output from the level that would arise under globally ﬂexible prices and
no wage markup shocks, i.e., the level of output that corresponds to the
cooperative steady state. We emphasize that e e yt is distinct from the domestic
output gap, e yt, which is the percent deviation of output that would arise
when domestic prices are ﬂexible, but taking foreign output as given (along
with no wage markup shocks), i.e., the level of output in the Nash steady
state. It follows from equation (41) that e e yt is related to e yt, as follows:






Observe that if foreign output does not aﬀect domestic marginal cost (i.e.,
κo =0 ), then the the distinction between the two gap concepts vanishes.
As we show in the appendix, given the deﬁnition of e e yt, as e c o n do r d e r
approximation to the objective function around the socially optimal (coop-


































δ, α = λ
ξ, α∗ = λ∗
ξ and,
Φ ≡
δ (1 − σ) γ(1 − γ)
ξ
where, as in the noncooperative case, losses due to deviations from the steady
state are measured in terms of percentages of steady state consumption.
21Combining equations (50) and (66), as well as the analogue equations for
the foreign countries, permits us to express the respective aggregate supply
curves in terms of the home and foreign output gaps, as follows:
πt = β Et{πt+1} + λ e e yt + λo e e y
∗
t + ut (68)
π
∗
t = β Et{π
∗
t+1} + λ




o e e yt + u
∗
t (69)
where λo = δκo reﬂects the sensitivity of the home country’s domestic inﬂa-




o is the analogue for the
foreign domestic inﬂation. Note that the signs of λo and λ
∗
o depend positively
on the respective elasticities of marginal costs with respect to foreign out-
put, κo and κ∗
o (see equation (35)). For example, if a rise in foreign output
reduces domestic marginal cost (κo < 0), then through this channel, a rise in
the foreign output gap will reduce domestic inﬂation.
In the cooperative case we assume that the central banks jointly max-
imize the objective given by (67) on a period by period basis, subject to
the constraints given by (68) and (69). In addition, expectations of future
inﬂation are taken as given by the policymakers (in other words we solve
for the time consistent, jointly optimal policy). Hence, as in the Nash case
analyzed in the previous section, we assume that the monetary authorities
cannot commit to a state-contingent policy rule that binds them into the
future.
The ﬁrst order conditions are now:




















e e yt + ξπ t
´
(71)
which can be combined to yield:
e e yt = − ξπ t (72)
e e y
∗
t = − ξπ
∗
t (73)
Under cooperation, each central bank adjusts the output gap to counter
deviations of domestic inﬂation from target. Indeed, the optimality condi-
tions are identical to the Nash case (equation (57)), but with the output
gaps e e yt and e e y
∗
t replacing the domestic output gaps e yt and e y∗
t. This distinc-
tion emerges for the following reason: When evaluating the tradeoﬀ between
22output and inﬂation, the central bank uses as the bliss point for output the
natural level under globally ﬂexible prices as opposed to the domestic nat-
ural level, since under cooperation it does not take foreign output as given
Further, because the aggregate supply curve is unchanged as are the rela-
tive weights on domestic inﬂation in the loss function (α and α∗),t h es l o p e
coeﬃcient ξ remains the same across the Nash and cooperative cases.
To gain some further perspective on how the solution under cooperation
diﬀers from the Nash case, we can use equation (66) to rewrite the optimality
conditions in terms of the domestic output gaps as follows:














In contrast to the Nash policy-maker, in setting the domestic output gap,
the cooperative policy-maker takes into account foreign inﬂation as well as
home inﬂation. The weight on foreign inﬂation, further, depends on the sign
and relative strength of the spillover of the foreign output gap on domestic
marginal cost measured by the ratio κo/κ.
Suppose, for example, that there is a rise in foreign inﬂation, π∗
t. Under
the optimal policy the foreign central bank contracts its output gap, e e y
∗
t,
w h i c hi nt u r na ﬀects the home country’s domestic output gap, e yt,a c c o r d i n g
to equation (66). If the spillover is negative (i.e., the terms of trade eﬀect
dominates, implying κo < 0), the contraction in foreign output reduces the
home country’s domestic natural level of output, implying an increase in e yt.
If there are no domestic inﬂationary pressures (i.e., πt =0 ), it is optimal
under cooperation for the home central bank to accept the increase in e yt in
order to keep the overall output gap, e e yt, ﬁxed at zero. By contrast, under
Nash, the central bank instead insulates the domestic output gap, e yt,f r o m
foreign inﬂation.
Under the cooperative equilibrium, accordingly, inﬂationary pressures
generated by cost push shocks can spill over from one country to another.
In the symmetric equilibrium, the reduced form expressions for home and
foreign inﬂa t i o na r eg i v e nb y










23with ψ =[ 1− βρ+ξ(λ − λo)]−1 and ψ =[ 1− βρ+ ξ(λ + λo)]−1, and where,
as before, ψ =[ 1− βρ + ξλ]−1. In the case of negative spillovers (κo < 0),
for example, a rise in the foreign cost push shock, u∗
t, leads to an increase
in domestic inﬂation, πt. This “importing” of inﬂation is a consequence of
permitting a rise in the domestic output gap, e yt, and hence domestic marginal
cost as the optimal policy under cooperation dictates in this case. Under
Nash, in contrast, inﬂationary pressures do not spill over across countries.
In general, as long as the marginal cost spillover is present (i.e., κo 6=0 ),
the equilibrium under cooperation diﬀers from the Nash equilibrium, imply-
ing potential gains from policy coordination. Note that in the absence of
the spillover (i.e. κo =0 ) the the domestic output gap responds to inﬂation
exactly as in the Nash case, as equations (72) and (74) suggest. In turn,
domestic inﬂation in this case is identical to the Nash case, as equation (76)
implies (keeping in mind that λo = δκo).
From equation (37), we know that κo 6=0iﬀ σ 6=1 , i.e., if preferences
over consumption are not logarithmic. Thus we have:
Proposition 2 There is a gain to monetary policy cooperation unless σ =1 .
We emphasize again that the potential gains come from the spillover of
foreign economic activity on domestic marginal cost. This contrasts with
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), who assume σ =1 , but allow for imperfect ex-
change rate pass-through. In the special case of their model that features
complete pass-through, they also ﬁnd no gain to monetary policy coopera-
tion.
Finally, we can derive some implications for the behavior of the nominal
interest rate and the real exchange rate under cooperation. Combining the
optimality condition (74) with the IS curve (49) yields
rt = rr
d















Proposition 3 Optimal policy in the cooperative equilibrium can be written
as a Taylor rule which is linear in the equilibrium real interest rate, domestic
inﬂation, and foreign inﬂation.
24With κo < 0, for example, as we noted earlier, it was optimal for the
central bank to permit to domestic output gap to rise in response to an
increase in foreign inﬂation. This suggests that, in response to a rise in
foreign inﬂation, the central bank should increase the interest by less relative
to the Nash case. The reverse is true, of course, if κo > 0.
F i n a l l y ,i nt h es y m m e t r i cc a s e ,t h et e r m so ft r a d ea n dt h en o m i n a le x -
change rate are given by:
st =( e e yt − e e y
∗
t)+( yt − y
∗
t) (78)
= −ξψ · ψ(ψ
−1 + κoδξ)(ut − u
∗
t)+( at − a
∗
t)
et ≡ et−1 + st − st−1 + πt − π
∗
t (79)
= et−1 − (ξ − 1)ψ · ψ(ψ
−1 + κoδξ)(ut − u
∗
t)+ξψ · ψ(ψ






Note that the expressions are the same as in the Nash case, except that
the sensitivity of both st and et to cost push shocks diﬀers in general under
cooperation, depending on the sign and magnitude of the spillover parameter,
κo. Interestingly, the impact of relative productivity shocks on terms of trade
and exchange rate variability is the same as under Nash, reﬂecting the fact
that these shocks do not force a tradeoﬀ between output gap and inﬂation
stabilization. In either case, accordingly, under cooperation the nominal
exchange rate should be free to vary in response to both relative cost push
shocks and relative productivity shocks. Thus we have:
Proposition 4 Under cooperation, a system of ﬂoating exchange rates is
optimal. The marginal cost spillover aﬀects the sensitivity of the exchange
rate to relative cost push pressures, but it does not aﬀect the sensitivity to
relative productivity shocks.
Finally, we note that it is possible to explicitly calculate the gain from
policy coordination by evaluating the loss function (67) under the coopera-
tive equilibrium and Nash equilibrium values of πt and e e yt. Since a serious
model calibration is beyond the scope of this paper, we save this exercise for
subsequent research. We only observe here, that to ﬁnd a quantitatively im-
portant gain from coordination within this framework, at a minimum, there
must be a nontrivial spillover eﬀect of foreign output on domestic marginal
cost, as measured by the ratio κo/κ.
256C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
A virtue of our framework is that we are able to derive sharp analytical
results, while still allowing each central bank to face a short run tradeoﬀ
between output and inﬂation, in contrast to much of the existing literature.
Of course, we obtained these results by making some strong assumptions.
It would be desirable to consider the implications of relaxing these assump-
tions, including: allowing for imperfect consumption risk sharing, pricing-
to-market, and trade in intermediate inputs. We considering the latter par-
ticularly interesting, as it would provide an additional eﬀect of openness on
marginal cost, which is the main channel in our model through which there
are gains from cooperation.
Finally, while we have considered gains from cooperation, we have not
considered the gains from commitment that arise in the closed economy vari-
ant of our framework (see, e.g., Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999 and Wood-
ford, 1999). It is straightforward to allow for commitment, and we expect
that doing so will produce some interesting implications for the behavior of
the equilibrium exchange rate.
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28Appendix: Policy Objectives and Optimal
Subsidies for the Nash and Cooperative Equi-
libria
We now derive a second order approximation to the central bank’s policy
objective in the Nash and cooperative cases. Below we make frequent use of












n) represents terms that are of order higher than nth,i nt h e
bound kak on the amplitude of the relevant shocks. We begin with the
non-cooperative case and then turn to the cooperative case.
CASE #1: Non-Cooperative Case (Nash equilibrium)
In this case the policymaker seeks to maximize the utility of the do-
mestic representative consumer, taking as given the other country’s policy
and outcomes. Below we derive a second order approximation of the period
utility U(Ct) − V (Nt) about the steady state associated with the optimal
non-cooperative choice of a subsidy rate. The latter is chosen to maximize
U(C)−V (N) subject to C = k (N)1−γ(Y ∗)γ, while taking Y ∗ parametrically.
The associated optimality condition requires V 0(N)N = U0(C)C (1 − γ).
Notice that in the equilibrium steady state (with A = A∗ =1 ), we have
(1 + µ
p)







=( 1 + µ
w)( 1− τ)( 1− γ)
where the third equality makes use of the optimality condition derived above,
as well as of (31) (evaluated at the steady state). Hence, the optimal choice
of τ in the Nash equilibrium satisﬁes:
(1 − τ)(1 + µ
w)(1 + µ
p)(1 − γ)=1
We start by approximating the utility of consumption U(Ct) about the
value of consumption that would prevail under the domestic ﬂexible price
















(1 − γ) e yt +
1
2







where the second equality follows from (32) in the text, and the fact that
foreign output is taken as given in the non-cooperative case considered here.
Furthermore, linearization of U0(Ct)Ct about the steady state implies:
U
0(Ct) Ct = U
0(C)C +[ U
00(C)C + U




0(C)C (1 − σ) ct + o(kak
2)
where ct ≡ log Ct
C denotes the percent deviation of ﬂexible price consumption
from its steady state level.




(1 − γ) e yt +
1
2
(1 − σ)( 1− γ)
2 e y
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t +( 1− σ)(1 − γ) ct e yt
¸








(1 − σ)(1 − γ) e y
2
t +( 1+φ) nt e yt
¸
+ t.i.p. + o(kak
3)
where the second equality makes use of the equilibrium relationship (1 −
σ) ct =( 1+φ) nt. The latter condition, in turn, can be derived from the ﬁrst
order conditions of the consumer’s problem, which, together with optimal
price setting under ﬂexible prices imply σ ct + φ nt + γ st = at,a sw e l la s
yt = ct + γ st (where all lower case variables with an upper bar denote log
deviations from steady state)
Similarly, we can approximate the disutility of labor V (Nt) about the
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di .A c c o r d i n g l y ,
e nt = e yt + vt








Lemma 1: let σ2
p,t ≡
R 1
0 (pH,t(i) − pH,t)2 di the cross-sectional dispersion




Proof: see Galí and Monacelli (2001).
From the previous Lemma, it follows that nt e nt = nt e yt + o(kak
3).T h u s ,


















As discussed above, the optimal subsidy under Nash case supports the
steady state condition V 0(N)N = U0(C)C(1−γ). Ignoring terms that depend
exclusively on foreign variables (and which are taken as given by the domestic
policymaker in the non-coperative case), allows us to rewite the period utility
for the home consumer as:












+ t.i.p. + o(kak
3)










t,w h e r eδ ≡
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ .
Proof: Woodford (2001, NBER WP8071), pp 22-23.
Collecting all the previous results, we can write the second order ap-
proximation to the objective function of the home central bank in the non-




















δ and α = δκ
ξ = λ
ξ.
It is straightforward to obtain an analogous objective function for the
foreign central bank.
CASE #2: Cooperative Case
The period utility in the joint objective function to be maximized takes
the form:
U(Ct) − (1 − γ)V (Nt) − γV (N
∗
t )
The choice variables include output, employment, and consumption in both
countries, simultaneously. In this joint optimization problem policymakers
no longer take the other country’s variables as given. This interdependence is
taken into account in deriving the second order approximation to the above
objective function, which is taken about the steady state associated with the
optimal cooperative choice of a subsidy rate. The latter is chosen to max-
imize the previous objective function to C =( N)1−γ(N∗)γ. The associated
optimality condition requires and V 0(N)N = U0(C)C
Notice that in the equilibrium steady state (with A = A∗ =1 ), we have
(1 + µ
p)







=( 1 + µ
w)( 1− τ)
where the third equality makes use of the optimality condition derived above,
as well as of (31) (evaluated at the steady state). Hence, the optimal choice
of τ in the cooperative equilibrium satisﬁes:
(1 − τ)(1 + µ
w)(1 + µ
p)=1
Recalling that variables with double upper bars denote equilibrium values
under globally ﬂexible prices (and double tildes deviations from the latter),
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where the second equality follows from (32) in the text.









0(C)C (1 − σ) ct + o(kak
2)
where ct ≡ log Ct
C denotes the percent deviation of consumption from its
steady state level, in the world ﬂexible price equilibrium.
Hence,
U(Ct)=U
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¸
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3)
33A similar expression holds for V (Nt) the foreign country.
Using the second order approximations derived above and imposing the
steady state (jointly) optimal condition V 0(N)N = U0(C)C (which is as-
sumed to be supported by the appropiate common subsidy), allows us to
write the (normalized) period objective as:































































δ, α = λ
ξ,a n dα = λ∗
ξ
Φ ≡
δ (1 − σ) γ(1 − γ)
ξ
where, as in the noncooperative case, losses due to deviations from the steady
state are measured in terms of percentages of steady state consumption.
34